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Note
HOW NON-PRODUCT-SPECIFIC
MANUFACTURING PATENTS BLOCK
BIOSIMILARS
CHORONG SONG†
ABSTRACT
A new class of drugs called biologics has potential to finally cure
previously untreatable conditions such as cancer and Alzheimer’s
disease. But there is a catch: these innovative drugs are expensive. On
average, prices range from $10,000 to $30,000 per year, and the most
expensive ones exceed $500,000. The Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) was passed in 2010 to lower prices by
providing a new regulatory pathway in approving biosimilars––copies
of brand-name biologics. Yet, the BPCIA’s promised regulation of
drug prices has not materialized partly due to brand-name companies’
vast patent portfolios, also known as patent thickets. This Note
analyzed all BPCIA patents disputed in BPCIA litigations and found
that over half of the asserted patents are manufacturing method patents,
many of which were filed years after FDA approval. Given the nonproduct-specific nature of these patents and stringent FDA
requirements, these inventions are not only unnecessary, but are also
unlikely to be practiced when producing brand-name biologics.
Regardless of their actual worth, these patents are extremely valuable
to brand-name manufacturers because even a patent of marginal
improvement can foreclose biosimilar access entirely. This Note
proposes that brand-name manufacturers should be required to
disclose related patents at the time of the FDA approval and share the
FDA license application with biosimilar manufacturers. Further,
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Congress should eliminate the availability of injunctive remedies for
these problematic assertions of patents.

INTRODUCTION
In June 2021, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approved aducanumab, the first new Alzheimer’s drug in nearly two
decades.1 Aducanumab is also the first drug that can potentially reverse
the progression of the disease by removing “amyloid beta plaques in
the brain.”2 Aducanumab is a genetically engineered monoclonal
antibody that binds to amyloid molecules.3 Once the binding occurs,
the body’s immune system recognizes the amyloid beta plaques as
foreign invaders and removes the plaques.4 Scientists expect that “once
the plaques are removed, the brain cells will stop dying.”5 More than
six million patients in the United States can finally hope to slow down
the devastating effects of memory loss and impaired cognitive
functioning.6
Aducanumab belongs to a class of drug called biologics, which are
at the heart of both new drug innovations and the United States’ drug
pricing crisis.7 Biologics, on average, cost about $10,000 to $30,000 per

1. Patrizia Cavazzoni, FDA’s Decision To Approve New Treatment for Alzheimer’s Disease,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 7, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-humandrugs/fdas-decision-approve-new-treatment-alzheimers-disease [https://perma.cc/U6KY-MMGS].
2. Id.
3. Andrew E. Budson, A New Alzheimer’s Drug Has Been Approved. But Should You Take
It?, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G (July 15, 2021), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/a-newalzheimers-drug-has-been-approved-but-should-you-take-it-202106082483 [https://perma.cc/MT7CKAJF].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. (“The hope and expectation are that . . . thinking, memory, function, and behavior
will stop deteriorating.”); Cavazzoni, supra note 1 (“[M]ore than 6 million Americans are living
with Alzheimer’s disease . . . .”). Despite the FDA’s approval, many scientists questioned whether
the drug indeed confers clinical benefits due to limited data from clinical trials. Pam Belluck,
Many Alzheimer’s Experts Say Use of Aduhelm Should Be Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/health/aduhelm-alzheimers-drug.html [https://perma.cc/E8ALXD77] (last updated Sept. 2, 2021); Pam Belluck & Rebecca Robbins, Alzheimer’s Drug Poses a
Dilemma for the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/05/health/alzheimersaducanumab-fda.html [https://perma.cc/KD2J-XMAZ] (last updated Oct. 20, 2021).
7. See Avik Roy, Biologic Medicines: The Biggest Driver of Rising Drug Prices, FORBES
(Mar. 8, 2019, 8:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2019/03/08/biologicmedicines-the-biggest-driver-of-rising-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/M4GF-VFGW] (“[O]ne
issue that is at the heart of high prices has attracted little attention: the role of biologic drugs in
rising drug costs.”).
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year and the most expensive ones exceed $500,000.8 In 2017, biologics
represented only “2 percent of all U.S. prescriptions, but [accounted
for] 37 percent of net drug spending,” as well as 93 percent of the
overall growth in drug spending since 2014.9 Aducanumab, priced at
nearly $60,000 per patient per year, “could cost upward of $100 billion
a year,” potentially doubling Medicare’s current drug spending
budget.10 In 2020, Medicare spending exceeded $800 billion.11 The cost
of these expensive drugs affects all U.S. patients and taxpayers by
raising insurance premiums and taxes.12
Biologics13 refer to large complex molecules produced or
extracted from living systems such as microorganisms or living cells.14
While traditional chemical drugs called small molecules have fixed
chemical structures, most biologics have dynamic and complex three-

8. Brian K. Chen, Y. Tony Yang & Charles L. Bennett, Why Biologics and Biosimilars
Remain So Expensive: Despite Two Wins for Biosimilars, the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Do
Not Solve Fundamental Barriers to Competition, 78 SPRINGER NATURE 1777, 1777 (2018).
9. Roy, supra note 7.
10. Dylan Scott, The New Alzheimer’s Drug That Could Break Medicare, VOX (June 10,
2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22524608/new-alzheimers-drug-costfda-approval-biogen [https://perma.cc/RKF2-JRWJ]. While this Note was in late-stage editing,
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services announced that Medicare will cover Aduhelm, a
brand-name for aducanumab, subject to evidence development. This decision likely means that
Medicare will not experience as large of an increase in spending, but Medicare still cautioned that
“[i]t is not hard to imagine a future scenario where a combination of a high-priced drug and high
utilization actually do generate billions of dollars in additional Medicare spending annually.”
Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Medicare’s Coverage Decision for the New Alzheimer’s Drug
and Why It Matters, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2022), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/
medicares-coverage-decision-for-the-new-alzheimers-drug-and-why-it-matters [https://perma.cc/
U6MY-PSBX].
11. National Health Spending in 2020 Increases Due to Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 15, 2021), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/national-health-spending-2020-increases-due-impact-covid-19-pandemic [https://
perma.cc/2E8T-74EK].
12. Scott, supra note 10.
13. The FDA defines “[b]iological product” as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product,
or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic
compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings.” 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h) (2021).
14. How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., https://
archive.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ [https://perma.cc/4PZD-7R87].
Recombinant proteins (including insulin), gene therapies, monoclonal antibodies, and vaccines
are different types of biologics. Ruth Jessen Hickman, What Are Biologic Treatments?,
VERYWELL HEALTH, https://www.verywellhealth.com/biologics-or-biological-agents-2615117
[https://perma.cc/9NGS-3W3B] (last updated June 25, 2020).
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dimensional structures.15 If vehicles are used to illustrate the size and
complexity of these molecules, “aspirin [would be] a bicycle, a small
biologic would be a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F16 fighter jet.”16 These complex structures allow fine-tuned interactions
with human cells and can improve clinical outcomes for previously
untreatable conditions such as cancer and Alzheimer’s disease.17 New
gene-editing and cell engineering technologies have the potential to
cure genetic diseases and different types of cancer.18
When President Barack Obama signed the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) in 2010,19 the BPCIA
anticipated an opening of the biologics market to competition and a
significant drop in prices.20 The BPCIA finally paved a regulatory
pathway for approving biosimilars, which are copies of brand-name

15. See What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questi
ons-and-answers [https://perma.cc/CZ5J-GUF3] (last updated Feb. 6, 2018) (“In contrast to most
drugs that are chemically synthesized and their structure is known, most biologics are complex
mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized.”); Huy X. Ngo & Sylvie GarneauTsodikova, What Are the Drugs of the Future?, 9 MED. CHEM. COMMC’NS 757, 757 (2018) (“Smallmolecule drugs include the aspirin, diphenhydramine, and other molecules that we typically have
in our medicine cabinets.”).
16. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016) [hereinafter Price & Rai, Manufacturing
Barriers].
17. See Biologics (Biologic Drug Class), MEDICINENET, https://www.medicinenet.com/
biologics_biologic_drug_class/article.htm [https://perma.cc/9DPY-NUG8] (“Biologic drugs
are . . . the most advanced therapies available . . . . [They] have offered hope for many patients
who previously had no effective treatment options for their condition.”); Cavazzoni, supra note 1
(stating that the biologic aducanumab was approved as a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease).
18. See, e.g., CAR T Cells: Engineering Patients’ Immune Cells To Treat Their Cancers,
NAT’ L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/research/car-t-cells
[https://perma.cc/DDU6-N4DH] (last updated July 30, 2019) (describing how CAR-T cells can
treat cancer); NCI Staff, How CRISPR Is Changing Cancer Research and Treatment, NAT’L
CANCER INST. (July 27, 2020), https://www.cancer.gov/news-events/cancer-currents-blog/2020/
crispr-cancer-research-treatment [https://perma.cc/QYT3-LJ7M] (describing ways CRISPR
technology is changing cancer treatment).
19. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–
03, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262). The BPCIA was passed
as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id.
20. Yaniv Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act at 10—A Stocktaking,
7 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 81, 83 (2021) [hereinafter Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act].
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biologics.21 Biosimilars can improve the affordability of older biologics
by offering cheaper alternatives.22 However, as of March 2020, the
FDA approved only twenty-six biosimilars against nine brand-name
biologics.23 And as of May 2020, only sixteen of these twenty-six
biosimilars were launched in the United States.24 About 85 percent of
biologics that should face biosimilar challenges are not facing any
today.25 The biosimilar entry rate in the United States also lags
significantly behind that of Europe. As of January 2022, the European
Medicines Agency had approved seventy biosimilars.26
Moreover, even after biosimilars enter the market, the price of
biologics does not decline much when compared to the drop witnessed
when generics—identical copies of small molecules—enter the
market.27 For example, the average price of Herceptin biosimilars
“remains 26 percent higher than the [original] 2007 price for branded
Herceptin,” even though five biosimilars have entered the market since
then.28 On average, the price of biosimilars is about 24 to 27 percent

21. § 7002, 124 Stat. at 805–08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)); see Heled, The
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, supra note 20, at 83–84 (discussing how
biosimilars entered the market after enactment of the BPCIA). Under the BPCIA,
The term ‘biosimilar’ or ‘biosimilarity’ . . . means . . . that the biological product is
highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically
inactive components . . . and [that] there are no clinically meaningful differences
between the biological product and the [original] product in terms of the safety, purity,
and potency of the product.
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
22. Claire Bugos, Low-Cost Biosimilar Is Set To Disrupt the Drug Market, VERYWELL
HEALTH (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.verywellhealth.com/biosimilar-lower-drug-cost-5198235
[https://perma.cc/N8UG-W3RG].
23. Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, supra note 20, at 84.
24. Id. at 85.
25. Peter B. Bach & Mark R. Trusheim, The Drugs at the Heart of Our Pricing Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/opinion/how-to-control-drugprices.html [https://perma.cc/55PG-CSX2] (“By our count, 85 percent of biologic drugs that
should be squaring off against biosimilar competitors face none.”); Nancy Yu, Mark R. Trusheim
& Peter B. Bach, Biosimilars: Market Changes Do Not Equal Policy Success, DRUG PRICING LAB
(Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.drugpricinglab.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Biosimilar-marketupdate-3_12_21-formatted.pdf [https://perma.cc/35TM-7EPK].
26. Biosimilars Approved in Europe, GENERICS & BIOSIMILAR INITIATIVE, https://
www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/General/Biosimilars-approved-in-Europe [https://perma.cc/
ZRL7-VY2V] (last updated Jan. 28, 2022) (noting that the European Medicines Agency “has
recommended the approval of [eighty-four] biosimilars,” but fourteen biosimilar approvals have
been withdrawn after approval).
27. Bach & Trusheim, supra note 25.
28. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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lower than that of brand-name biologics.29 This number pales in
comparison to the price drop of more than 70 percent typically
observed for generics observed after four or five generics have entered
the market.30
Limited availability and high prices of biosimilars are, at least in
part, due to brand-name companies’ vast patent portfolios, also known
as patent thickets.31 Only a tiny percentage of the patent portfolio
consists of primary patents that protect the key “billion-dollar
molecules.”32 The vast majority of the portfolio consists of secondary
patents that protect follow-on innovations such as manufacturing
methods, new indications, or formulations.33 While manufacturing
patents34 are rarely disputed in litigations involving small molecules,
these patents are at the center of disputes for biologics. The synthesis
of traditional chemical drugs is generally well-understood, and generics
are essentially identical to the original drug regardless of its chemical
synthesis pathway.35 Manufacturing through living cells is more
complex and offers more opportunities for patenting.36 In biologics,

29. Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, supra note 20, at 85.
30. Id. at 86 n.21.
31. See, e.g., Stanton R. Mehr, Can the FTC Clear a Path for Biosimilar Access Through the
Patent Thicket?, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (June 4, 2019), https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/
can-the-ftc-clear-a-path-for-biosimilar-access-through-the-patent-thicket-0001 [https://perma.cc/
695B-S8BC] (“The existence of what we now call ‘patent thickets’ is a threat to the biosimilar
industry . . . .”); Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents To
Delay Generic Versions, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/
business/makers-of-humira-and-enbrel-using-new-drug-patents-to-delay-generic-versions.html [https://
perma.cc/7Q5F-57HG] (quoting an AbbVie executive’s statement that “[a]ny company seeking to
market a biosimilar version of Humira will have to contend with this extensive patent estate,
which AbbVie intends to enforce vigorously”); Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the
World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-shield-of-patents-protects-the-world-s-bestselling-drug [https://perma.cc/37NG-JF6D] (“The more than 100 patents AbbVie has secured
over Humira’s lifetime make it difficult for another company to replicate the drug . . . .”); Roy,
supra note 7 (noting that manufacturing costs, clinical trials, and uncertainty created by the patent
thickets lead to the high costs of biosimilars).
32. See infra Part II. For the terminology “billion-dollar molecules,” see generally BARRY
WORTH, THE BILLION DOLLAR MOLECULE: ONE COMPANY’S QUEST FOR THE PERFECT DRUG
(2014).
33. See infra Part II.
34. In this Note, the term “manufacturing patents” refers to a subset of secondary patents
that protect manufacturing technologies and methods.
35. Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1034.
36. Id. (“Biologics, as opposed to small-molecule drugs, are typically far more pathdependent entities.”); Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of Biologics Manufacturing
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“the [manufacturing] process is the product,” and any variation in the
process could lead to a material change in the product’s safety or
efficacy.37 For example, even minor changes in pH during the
manufacturing process can impact how proteins fold and ultimately
change how drugs interact with cells.38 In short, biosimilar developers
must mimic the originator’s manufacturing processes as much as
possible to ensure the product’s safety and efficacy, while avoiding
infringing secondary patents protecting the underlying manufacturing
technologies.
This Note documents, for the first time, how patents not practiced
in original biologics can be used to delay and block the entry of
biosimilars. Suppose a patented mRNA technology leads to the
development of a new COVID-19 vaccine. Once the patent and
statutory exclusivity periods39 expire, other companies should
theoretically be able to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines using the
same mRNA technology, create alternatives for patients, and lower
vaccine prices. However, under the current BPCIA framework,
manufacturing patents can both delay or block the entry of alternative
vaccines and unduly extend the exclusivity period, regardless of
whether the manufacturer uses the technology to make the original
COVID-19 vaccine.
By analyzing all patents disputed in BPCIA litigations, this Note
reveals that over 50 percent of the asserted patents covered
manufacturing technologies, and 61 percent were filed more than one
Information, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 54, 56 (2019) [hereinafter Heled, The Case for Disclosure]
(“[I]t is broadly accepted that short of meticulously replicating the process of making a biologic
under the same conditions and using the same cell line, it would be very difficult and sometimes
impossible to guarantee identity or even near identity between an original biologic and its followon version(s).”).
37. Huub Schellekens, How Similar Do ‘Biosimilars’ Need To Be?, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1357, 1357 (2004).
38. See BPI Contributor, Buffer Selection in Biologics Manufacturing, BIOPROCESS INT’L
(June 27, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://bioprocessintl.com/sponsored-content/buffer-selection-biologicsmanufacturing [https://perma.cc/HZT5-ZFFU] (“The production and purification of these
biologic products require the use of different buffers for pH control and stabilization of the
reactions in the various steps during manufacture.”).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (setting a twelve-year statutory exclusivity period).
“[M]arket exclusivity” refers to “a period during which potential generic competitors are not
allowed to enter the particular product’s market, which is typically enforced by a prohibition on
the FDA to approve applications for comparable generic products for the duration of the
exclusivity period.” Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 436
n.67 (2012) [hereinafter Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities].
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year after the FDA approval of original biologics.40 Further analysis of
those postapproval patents covering manufacturing technologies
showed that about 53 percent were non-product-specific
manufacturing patents.41
The Note proposes novel legislative solutions to combat abusive
patent practices. First, brand-name manufacturers should be required
to disclose product-associated patents at the time of FDA approval so
that biosimilar companies can either proactively challenge patents’
validity or “design around” the patented technologies early in
biosimilar development process. Second, brand-name manufacturers
should be required to share their FDA license information with
biosimilar companies. With the FDA license in hand, biosimilar
companies can assess the asserted patents’ relevancy to original
biologics. Third, injunctive remedies should be eliminated in disputes
around secondary patents. Without injunctive remedies, parties are
more likely to negotiate and reach a fair price that matches the actual
value of patented technologies.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I explains the key provisions
contained in the BPCIA and its major shortcomings in moderating
drug prices. Part II introduces the methodology used to analyze patents
disputed in BPCIA litigations and shares the study’s key findings. Part
III offers several suggestions that can improve transparency and curb
abusive patent assertions.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION ACT
This Section introduces protections available for drugs in the form
of patents and statutory exclusivity periods, and how the BPCIA
anticipated an opening of the biologics market to competition once
those protections expired. However, biosimilar entry in the United
States lags significantly behind that of Europe and Japan due to the
impassable patent blockades set up by brand-name biologics.42

40. See infra Part II. These postapproval patents, by definition, could not have been used to
make products at launch, because practicing the invention for more than a year extinguishes any
patent rights. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, How Logically Impossible Patents Block
Biosimilars, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 862, 862 (2019).
41. See infra Part II. Postapproval patents refer to patents that were filed more than one year
after the FDA approval of original biologics.
42. Chen et al., supra note 8, at 1777–78.
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Patent rights “have the attributes of personal property.”43 A
patent grants a time-limited monopoly “to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”44 Under
current law, patent protections last twenty years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).45 Granting patent rights dates to the
fifteenth century46 and appears in the U.S. Constitution: “The Congress
shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective . . . Discoveries.”47 Patents promote innovation in
two ways. First, patents provide financial incentives to invest in and
invent intangible ideas.48 Second, patents compel disclosure of the
inventions in exchange for an exclusive right to practice that
innovation.49 Such disclosure fosters the industry’s growth as a whole
by ensuring that up-to-date technical information becomes publicly
accessible.50
In addition to patents, statutory exclusivity periods following the
approval of original drugs protect small molecules and biologics.51
During statutory exclusivity periods, the FDA is barred from
approving follow-on products such as generics or biosimilars.52
Although both patents and statutory exclusivity periods offer timelimited monopolies, patents are enforced by filing infringement suits in
courts, while statutory exclusivity periods are enforced by the FDA’s
rejection of follow-on product applications.53
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
44. Id. § 154(a)(1)–(2).
45. Id. § 154(a)(2).
46. Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 168–69 (1948).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8.
48. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATS., TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (Comm. Print
1958).
49. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 247 (7th ed. 2017) (“[T]he prevailing [notion of the] ‘contract’
metaphor . . . [dictates] that disclosure of an invention . . . [is] the price the inventor pa[ys] for the
reward of a patent.”).
50. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 39, at 426 (“An underlying premise
of this theory is that the required disclosure of the invention by the inventor, once made, will
enable the public to build upon the disclosed technology to further innovation.”).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A); supra note 39.
53. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 39, at 430–31.
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To introduce a biologic into interstate commerce, the
manufacturer must first obtain a license from the FDA.54 The
manufacturer must demonstrate safety, efficacy, and purity to obtain a
license,55 which entails extensive research and development and
regulatory approval processes.56 To reduce costs and spur competition,
the BPCIA created an abbreviated regulatory pathway for the FDA to
approve biologics that are “biosimilar” to57 or “interchangeable” with
an already approved biologic.58 Unlike small molecules, biologics
cannot be fully replicated, and the FDA defines biosimilars as being
“highly similar to” original biologics with “no clinically meaningful
differences.”59 In addition, the BPCIA set up an intricate scheme called
the “patent dance” to resolve potential patent disputes against
biosimilars.60 The patent dance begins when a biosimilar applicant
sends a copy of the FDA application to the brand-name
manufacturer.61 It then leads to the exchange of the “list of patents for

54. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any biological product unless . . . a biologics license . . . is in effect for the
biological product . . . .”).
55. Id. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I); 21 C.F.R. § 600.2 (2021).
56. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.2(a), 601.20, 601.25, 601.27, 601.70 (2021) (specifying various
FDA approval requirements).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k), (i)(2).
58. Id. § 262(k), (i)(3). The original biologic is called a “reference product” under the
BPCIA. Id. § 262(i)(4).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2); Biosimilar and Interchangeable Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products [https://
perma.cc/CGP7-PYWT] (last updated Oct. 23, 2017) (“[S]light differences . . . are expected
during the manufacturing process for biological products, regardless of whether the product is a
biosimilar or a reference product.”).
60. A biosimilar applicant may choose not to engage in the patent dance. Sandoz Inc. v.
Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674–75 (2017) (holding that an applicant seeking approval of a
biosimilar cannot be forced to engage in the patent dance by an injunction under federal law); see
also Jon Tanaka, “Shall” We Dance? Interpreting the BPCIA’s Patent Provisions, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 659, 659 (2016) (“The patent dispute resolution process [in the BCPIA] included an
exchange of information—the biosimilar maker’s application and manufacturing information for
the reference product sponsor’s list of potentially infringed patents—termed the ‘patent dance.’”).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2). For simplicity and consistent terminology, “brand-name
manufacturer” refers to what the BPCIA calls the “reference product sponsor.” See id.
§ 262(l)(1)(a) (describing “the sponsor of the application for the reference product . . . as the
‘reference product sponsor’”). A biosimilar applicant can submit an abbreviated Biologics
License Application four years (or more) after FDA approval of the reference drug. Id.
§ 262(k)(7)(B). Although a biosimilar applicant need not submit the same safety and efficacy
data, it needs to submit “analytical studies that demonstrate . . . similar[ity] to the reference
product,” animal studies, and “conditions of use” clinical studies. See id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)
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which the [brand-name manufacturer] believes a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the biosimilar
applicant.62 Once both parties agree on the list, the brand-name
manufacturer must file a patent infringement complaint within thirty
days.63
The BPCIA was modeled after the Hatch-Waxman Act,64 which
harbingered a gold rush of generic applications.65 Under the HatchWaxman Act, generic manufacturers can leverage the safety and
efficacy data of the original drug to forgo costly and lengthy clinical
studies.66 Various studies estimate that pharmaceutical companies
spend about $1 billion to bring a new drug to market, with most of the
development costs arising from clinical trials.67 Generics often enter
the market as soon as original drug patents expire and replace as much
as 90 percent of the original drug’s market share within three months
of launch.68 Today, “[n]early 90 [percent] of prescriptions in the United
(listing the sources from which data on biosimilarity must be obtained and reported in the
application). Other required information is listed in id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II)–(V).
62. Id. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i). A reference drug sponsor cannot sue for infringement of patents
not included on this list. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(C).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4)(A), (6)(A). If the reference drug sponsor does not file a complaint
within thirty days, it cannot seek an injunction in court and will be entitled only to a reasonable
royalty that is an estimation of damages. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(A)–(B). In addition, the BPCIA
provides a mechanism for additional exchanges of patent lists in case the parties cannot agree on
a final patent list. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5)(B).
64. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21,
28, and 35 U.S.C.) (modifying the system for regulation and approval of generic pharmaceutical
drugs). For differences between small molecule and biologics drugs, see generally
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS: THE SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL,
AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF ANY FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS SCHEME 6–8 (Apr. 25, 2007),
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/WhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y888-2UXS].
65. What Is Hatch-Waxman?, PHRMA, https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/Ph
RMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/D-F/Fact-Sheet_What-is-Hatch-Waxman_June-2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UUB9-Y9JQ].
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2); see also Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36 (“[T]he
Hatch-Waxman Act gives the FDA the authority to approve a follow-on product based on the
assumption that if the original product was proven clinically safe and effective, and the two
products are the same, then the follow-on product is expected to be equally safe and effective.”).
67. See, e.g., Olivier J. Wouters, Martin McKee & Jeroen Luyten, Estimated Research and
Development Investment Needed To Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 844, 849, 851 (2020) (“Based on data for 63 therapeutic agents developed by 47 companies
between 2009 and 2018, the median research and development investment required to bring a
new drug to market was estimated to be $985 million, and the mean was estimated to be $1336
million.”).
68. PHRMA, supra note 65.
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States are filled with generics,” and “[m]ore than 80 [percent] of
approved pharmaceuticals have generic versions available.”69
Although almost a decade has passed since its enactment, the
BPCIA’s promised regulation of drug prices has not materialized.70 In
some ways, this is unsurprising. Economists generally predicted that
the impact of biosimilar entry under the BPCIA would be much less
drastic than was the case for generics.71 Unlike small molecules,
biologics cannot be easily replicated, and most of the technology is
protected by trade secrets.72 Biologics manufacturing begins with “a
highly specific (and potentially proprietary) . . . cell line,” and
subsequent steps involve “many standards and techniques [often]
developed in-house.”73 For FDA licensure, brand-name manufacturers
must submit the Biologics License Application, which includes detailed
manufacturing information under the Chemistry and Manufacturing
Controls (“CMC”) section.74 However, FDA regulation prohibits the
FDA from disclosing any manufacturing information, even after
product exclusivity and associated patents have expired.75

69. Id.
70. See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Rahul Guha & Maria Salgado, Biosimilar Competition:
Lessons from Europe, 13 NATURE REVS. 99, 100 (2014) (“[B]iosimilar price discounts are likely
to be modest compared to generics, reflecting much greater costs of development, fewer
competitors and the absence of interchangeability for the foreseeable future.”).
72. Lisa Diependaele, Julian Cockbain & Sigrid Sterckx, Similar or the Same? Why
Biosimilars Are Not the Solution, 46 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 776, 777 (2018); W. Nicholson Price II
& Arti K. Rai, Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars?, 348 SCIENCE 188, 188 (2015) (“The key
hurdle to competitive entry by biosimilar manufacturers, and thus to price reduction, is trade
secrecy in the biologics manufacturing process.”). For the definition of trade secrets, see Trade
Secrets / Regulatory Data Protection, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ippolicy/trade-secret-policy [https://perma.cc/U7ZX-U4KZ] (last updated Oct. 7, 2021, 1:45 PM).
73. Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36.
74. 21 C.F.R. § 601.2 (2021). The CMC section is updated throughout the product’s lifecycle,
as required by 21 C.F.R. § 601.12 (2021). The FDA also provides guidance documents to aid
manufacturers to fulfill the CMC requirements. CMC and GMP Guidances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/general-biologics-guidances/cmc-and
-gmp-guidances [https://perma.cc/DS6R-7H9H] (last updated Dec. 16, 2021).
75. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.51(f) (2021) (“The following data and information in a biological
product file are not available for public disclosure unless . . . they no longer represent a trade
secret . . . (1) Manufacturing methods or processes, including quality control procedures. . . . (3)
Quantitative or semiquantitative formulas.”); 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (2021) (“Data and information
submitted or divulged to the Food and Drug Administration which fall within the definitions of a
trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information are not available for public
disclosure.”). The FDA is also prohibited from comparing manufacturing processes of biosimilar
and reference drugs during the internal review. Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36.

SONG IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

HOW PATENTS BLOCK BIOSIMILARS

4/17/2022 12:43 PM

1935

Since biosimilars cannot be fully characterized in laboratories,
biosimilar applicants must conduct clinical studies to establish
comparability to original biologics.76 Animal and human clinical studies
must show that biosimilars have the same safety and efficacy profile as
the original drug.77 Due to clinical trial requirements and
manufacturing challenges, commercialization of a biosimilar takes
about eight to ten years and costs somewhere between $100 and $250
million.78 In comparison, generics take three to five years to develop
and cost only about $1 to 5 million.79 The exorbitant cost of developing
a biosimilar limits the competition and affordability of biosimilars.80
Finally, brand-name biologics “built impassable patent
blockades,” also known as patent thickets.81 The primary patents
protecting the key molecules of a drug generally expire before or

76. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc) (requiring that applications for marketing
approval of follow-on biologics include “a clinical study or studies . . . that are sufficient to
demonstrate safety, purity, and potency in 1 or more appropriate conditions of use for which the
[original] product is licensed and intended to be used”). This clinical study requirement has been
criticized for being wasteful and unethical. See, e.g., Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note
36, at 57 (“Especially problematic in this respect is . . . [that clinical studies] potentially expose
human subjects to the risk of significant harm only to confirm that a follow-on product is not more
dangerous or less efficacious than an already-approved product.”).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Diependaele et al., supra note 72, at 777–78
(“[T]he biosimilar applicant is required to prove that the differences between the candidatebiosimilar and the reference product are not clinically significant.”). For the “interchangeability”
designation, a biosimilar applicant must conduct an additional clinical study called the “switching
study.” See, e.g., Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36, at 57 (explaining that the intent
of switching study is to show that the biosimilar is expected to produce the same clinical result as
the original biologic and there is no risk of alternating between them). The interchangeability is
established when “the risk . . . of alternating or switching between use of the [biosimilar] product
and the [original] product is not greater than the risk of using the [original] product without such
alternation or switch.” 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(B). However, no interchangeable biologic has been
approved to date. See Biosimilar Product Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information [https://perma.cc/F4KZ-8AYQ]
(last updated Sept. 20, 2021) (listing approved biosimilars to date, but none is interchangeable).
78. Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36, at 57.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., id. at 55 (“[T]he prices of most biologics will likely remain high. Therefore, from
a public health standpoint, follow-on biologics are . . . a limited phenomenon, providing only few,
expensive options for payors, prescribers, and patients.”); Sarah Sorscher, A Longer Monopoly
for Biologics?: Considering the Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 285, 304–05 (2009) (discussing the high barriers to entry in the generic
biologics market, especially as compared to the barriers faced by manufacturers of generic smallmolecule drugs).
81. Bach & Trusheim, supra note 25; see, e.g., Mehr, supra note 31 (discussing “patent
thickets”).
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shortly after the statutory exclusivity period, during which the law
prohibits the FDA from approving biosimilars.82 The vast majority of
the patent thicket consists of secondary patents, which protect followon innovations such as manufacturing methods, new indications, or
formulations.83 For example, AbbVie, the manufacturer of Humira,
filed 247 patent applications for Humira, and 132 of the patents were
issued.84 The Biosimilars Council, an industry group for biosimilar
manufacturers, claimed that 75 of these patents were filed three years
prior to when biosimilar competition was set to begin.85 Shortly prior
to the FDA approval of Boehringer’s biosimilar, AbbVie filed a lawsuit
alleging that the biosimilar infringed 1,600 inventions across 74 Humira
patents.86 Boehringer settled with AbbVie, citing “the inherent
unpredictability of litigation, [and] the substantial costs of what would
have been a long and complicated legal process and ongoing distraction
to our business.”87 Although the primary patent on Humira expired in
2016,88 and the FDA has already approved six biosimilars, the

82. See Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1027 (“[U]nder the HatchWaxman Act of 1984, the originator firms’ small molecules are protected by patents and by a
short (five-year) period of exclusivity over the clinical trial data . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)
(setting a twelve-year statutory exclusivity period). For a description of market exclusivity, see
supra note 39.
83. Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts
(Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE, Dec.
2012, at 1, 6 (“[Drugs] may also be covered by [secondary] patents covering modified forms of
that base compound, medical uses of a known chemical compound, combinations of known
chemical compounds, particular formulations (tablets, topical forms), dosage regimens, and
processes, among others.”).
84. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTING IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES 7 (2018), https://
www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/I-MAK-Overpatented-Overpriced-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YP3Q-Y55X].
85. BIOSIMILARS COUNCIL, FAILURE TO LAUNCH: PATENT ABUSE BLOCKS ACCESS TO
BIOSIMILARS FOR AMERICA’S PATIENTS 8 (2019), https://www.biosimilarscouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Biosimilars-Council-White-Paper-Failure-to-Launch-June-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2F4-PVYQ]; About, BIOSIMILARS COUNCIL, https://biosimilarscouncil.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/FKR9-A3AD].
86. Complaint at 1, 8, 15, AbbVie Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GmbH, No. 1:17-cv01065-UNA (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2017) (stating that Humira “has resulted in more than 100 issued
United States patents . . . 74 of which AbbVie has identified as infringed”).
87. Andrew Dunn, With Boehringer Settlement, AbbVie Completes Humira Sweep,
BIOPHARMA DIVE (May 14, 2019), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/abbvie-boehringeringelheim-settle-humira-patent-biosimilar/554729 [https://perma.cc/RQ2G-6HMZ].
88. Human Antibodies That Bind Human TNF , U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382 (filed Feb. 9,
1996) (expiring Feb. 9, 2016).
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biosimilars will likely not be available in the U.S. market until at least
2023.89
In the next section, the Note will show how the patent dance,
which was originally intended to facilitate resolving patent disputes, is
being used to block biosimilar entries.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The analysis of all patents disputed during BPCIA litigations
revealed that 71 percent of manufacturing patents were filed a year
after the FDA’s approval of original biologics. Because the FDA
imposes stringent regulatory requirements for manufacturing changes
implemented after its approval, these inventions are not only
unnecessary but also unlikely to be practiced in manufacturing original
biologics. These unnecessary and unrelated manufacturing patents can
create a windfall for brand-name manufacturers by entirely forestalling
biosimilar access, even if the inventions confer only a marginal benefit
to the manufacturing process.
A. Assertion of Non-Product-Specific Manufacturing Patents to
Block Biosimilars
I conducted the empirical analysis of all patents disputed in
BPCIA litigations filed between 2014 and May 2021.90 The first goal
was to identify manufacturing patents filed more than one year after
their FDA approval. These postapproval patents, by definition, could
not have been used to make products at launch, because practicing the
invention for more than a year without seeking a patent extinguishes
any patent rights.91 A long line of cases, now codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102,
establishes that the inventor forfeits the right to obtain patents after
the inventions have been in use for more than one year.92 Since these

89. Christine Blank, When Humira Finally Faces Biosimilar Competition, Losses for AbbVie
May Not Be as Steep as Expected, Say Analysts, MANAGED HEALTHCARE (July 14, 2021), https://
www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/view/when-humira-finally-faces-biosimilar-competitionlosses-to-abbvie-may-not-be-as-steep-as-expected-says-analyst-report [https://perma.cc/X9ZF-XLAC].
90. For a list of the BPCIA litigations, see infra Appendix A.
91. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed
invention was . . . in public use . . . before the effective filing date . . . [unless] disclosure [was]
made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention . . . .”). This “forfeiture
rule” applies regardless of whether the process or product was used in secret.
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patents were not practiced prior to launch, these technologies are
deemed nonessential to make the product.
The second goal was to determine whether these post-approval
manufacturing patents were in any way related to original biologics.
Since manufacturing processes of original biologics are not publicly
available, the relationship was determined based on whether the
patents’ titles, abstracts, backgrounds, summaries of the invention, and
claims contained any references to original biologics.
A list of a total twenty-eight BPCIA litigations came from the Big
Molecule Watch website.93 The patents in dispute were collected from
individual complaints downloaded from Bloomberg Law.94 Patents’
filing, priority,95 and issuance dates were accessed from Google
Patent,96 and FDA approval dates were verified through the
Drugs@FDA database.97

[I]t is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his
discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with
either secrecy, or legal monopoly. . . . [I]f he goes beyond that [one year], he forfeits his
right regardless of how little the public may have learned about the invention; just as
he can forfeit it by too long concealment, even without exploiting the invention at all.
Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946); see
also Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630, 634 (2019) (holding
that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act did not later modify the meaning of “on sale,” and
hence the inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party barred the investor from receiving a
patent).
93. Big Molecule Watch: BPCIA Litigations, GOODWIN, https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com
/bpcia-patent-litigations [https://perma.cc/P8LU-JBJ4] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
BPCIA Litigations]. Big Molecule Watch, a blog by the law firm Goodwin, collects and publishes
up-to-date information on biosimilars, including litigation. Big Molecule Watch, GOODWIN,
https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com [https://perma.cc/BX73-SK8C].
94. BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com [https://perma.cc/48ZY-LAF4]. The
number of patents in dispute varied widely from litigation to litigation and ranged from 1 to 84,
with a median of 5.5. See supra note 90.
95. In patent jargon, the priority date is the date the patent was effectively filed. See 35
U.S.C. § 100(i)(1) (“‘[E]ffective filing date’ . . . means . . . the actual filing date of the patent or
the application for the patent containing a claim to the invention; or . . . the filing date of the
earliest application for which the patent or application is entitled . . . .”).
96. GOOGLE PATENTS, https://patents.google.com [https://perma.cc/7W92-8VDA].
97. Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.access
data.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/ [https://perma.cc/Y6QJ-T4CS].
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I first examined patents’ titles, abstracts, and claims and classified
them as active pharmaceutical ingredient (“API”),98 formulation,99
method of use,100 manufacturing process, or administration device
patents. Where patents listed several claims with multiple potential
classifications, the classification came from the first claim, because the
first claims tend to have the broadest scope and “represent what the
inventor sees as the most important” claim.101
By comparing patents’ priority and FDA approval dates, I
identified the patents that were filed more than one year after the FDA
approval of original biologics. Of the 511 patents asserted during
BPCIA litigations to date, 262 patents, or 52 percent, covered
manufacturing processes, and 311 patents, or 61 percent, were filed
more than one year after FDA approval. Of the 262 manufacturing
patents, about 186 patents, or 71 percent, were filed more than one year
after FDA approval.102 To put it differently, 71 percent of
manufacturing patents could not have been used to make products at
launch, yet were asserted to block biosimilar competition.

98. The API refers to “[a]ny substance . . . intended to furnish pharmacological activity or
other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or to
affect the structure and function of the body.” CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH. & CTR.
FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Q7 GOOD
MANUFACTURING PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR ACTIVE PHARMACEUTICAL INGREDIENTS:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 48 (2016).
99. Formulation is “the composition[] of the final product,” which usually contains the API
and inactive ingredients, which perform different functions such as improving stability or
adjusting the pH. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 39, at 445 n.114.
100. “[M]ethod-of-use patent[s are] issued when an inventor . . . discover[s] . . . a ‘novel,
useful, and non-obvious’ way” to use a patent. Roger D. Blair & Anita N. Walsh, Method-of-Use
Patents, Appropriability, and Antitrust Policy, 56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 651, 651 (2020). For example,
Rogaine was originally patented as a treatment of high blood pressure, but the inventor later
obtained a method-of-use patent in stimulating hair growth. Id. at 651–52.
101. Arti K. Rai & W. Nicholson Price II, An Administrative Fix for Manufacturing Process
Patent Thickets, 39 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 20, 21 (2021).
102. For a list of the patents, see infra Appendix B. Similar findings were reported in
literature. Price & Rai, An Administrative Fix for Manufacturing Process Patent Thickets, supra
note 101, at 21 (reporting that out of 552 patents asserted in 34 BPCIA litigations, 192 were
“manufacturing process patents filed over [one] year after [the] FDA approval” date).
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Figure 1: Classification by Patents’ Filing Dates (Manufacturing
Process Patents)

26%

After 1 year of FDA approval

3%

Within 1 year of FDA approval

71%

Before FDA approval

Lastly, I examined the titles, abstracts, backgrounds, summaries of
the invention, and claims, and then conducted key word searches using
product names and known molecule names of the patents filed more
than one year after FDA approval.103 If there was any reference to the
product, I classified it as a “product-specific” patent, because the
inventor at least considered practicing the invention for that product.
The list is likely overinclusive because I was conservative in using the
“non-product-specific” classification. Some patents listed more than
several dozen molecules without any information specific to an
individual molecule, but I still classified them as a product-specific
patent.
About 100 manufacturing patents, or 43 percent, were nonproduct-specific.104 The percentage of non-product-specific patents
would have been even higher if Humira patents were excluded because
all patents asserted during Humira litigations contained product
references. Most of these patents were manufacturing patents that

103. Molecule names were pulled from the Drugs@FDA database. See supra note 97.
104. For a list of the patents and their classifications, see infra Appendix B.
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lacked references to not just the product in the scope of litigation, but
also any product-identifying information.105
Given stringent post-approval regulatory requirements, original
biologics’ manufacturing processes likely do not use all of these
patents. The FDA requires extensive studies to prove that the changes
do not impact drugs’ efficacy or safety and an approval before
implementing any major manufacturing changes.106 For example,
Genentech, a brand-name manufacturer, asserted a 8,771,988 patent
(or “‘988 patent”) which disclosed “a method for the recombinant
production of a secreted heterologous immunoglobulin in a CHO
cell.”107 The adoption of this invention requires a new master cell
line,108 which is rarely, if ever, done.109 For these types of changes, the
FDA requires extensive validation studies and potentially new clinical
trials, because any genetic manipulation of the master cell line creates
a high risk of affecting the product’s “identity, strength, quality, purity,
or potency.”110 In three separate litigations, Genentech asserted an
8,633,302 patent (or “‘302 patent”) describing “a method for
concentrating an immunoglobulin solution by tangential flow

105. Id.
106. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(g), 601.12 (2021). See generally CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION
& RSCH. & CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RSCH., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: CHANGES TO AN APPROVED APPLICATION FOR SPECIFIED BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND SPECIFIED SYNTHETIC BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 3–4 (1997) [hereinafter FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY] (listing examples of changes that require FDA approval prior to
distribution).
107. Protein Expression from Multiple Nucleic Acids, U.S. Patent No. 8,771,988 col. 12 l. 1–3
(filed Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinafter ‘988 Patent]. Redacted Complaint at 10, 18, Genentech v. Amgen,
No. 18-924 (D. Del. July 2, 2018).
108. The Master Cell Bank refers to a selected clone of genetically modified cells that actively
produce active pharmaceutical ingredients. John Conner, Don Wuchterl, Maria Lopez, Bill
Minshall, Rabi Prusti, Dave Boclair, Jay Peterson & Chris Allen, Chapter 26: The
Biomanufacturing of Biotechnology Products, in BIOTECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
STARTING, MANAGING, AND LEADING BIOTECH COMPANIES 366–67 (Craig Shimasaki ed., 1st
ed. 2014).
109. Changes to the Master Cell Bank are not described in the FDA’s guidance document
listing classifications of common manufacturing changes. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY, supra note 106 (listing FDA classifications of common manufacturing changes).
110. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(a)(2) (2021); see Hugo Hamel & Hye-Na Kang, Quality Changes to
Approved Biotherapeutic Product: Simulated Case Studies on Reporting Categories & Supporting
Data Requirements, 62 BIOLOGICALS 1, 5 (2019) (classifying a generation of a new Master Cell
Bank “from the same expression construct with same or closely related cell line” as a major
change).

SONG IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1942

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/17/2022 12:43 PM

[Vol. 71:1923

filtration.”111 Practicing this patent likely means adding a new or
significantly modifying the tangential flow filtration step. In either case,
the FDA requires expensive and lengthy validation studies and its
approval prior to implementation.112
The manufacturers are highly resistant even to moderate or minor
changes because the costs associated with regulatory filings often
outweigh the benefits derived from these improvements.113 Even
moderate changes tend to introduce uncertainty114 that arises from
expensive and lengthy validation studies and regulatory filings.115 In
addition, manufacturers have to seek approvals from over one hundred
countries, because most biologics are marketed globally.116 Some
countries spend over twenty-four months reviewing a proposed
change, and rolling submissions can easily turn into a multiyear
endeavor.117 During this time, manufacturers must maintain both pre-

111. Variable Tangential Flow Filtration, U.S. Patent No. 8,633,302 col. 2 l. 1–3 (filed July 15,
2008). Redacted Complaint at 46–47, Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen Inc., No. 17-1471 (D. Del. Oct.
26, 2017); Complaint at 8, Genentech, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., No. 17-1672 (D. Del. Nov. 17, 2017);
Complaint at 14, Genentech, Inc. v. Celltrion, Inc., No. 18-1025 (D. Del. July 11, 2018).
112. See Ivan Soto, Validation Cost Reduction, IVT NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2014, 10:00 AM),
https://www.ivtnetwork.com/article/validation-cost-reduction [https://perma.cc/D348-XZBC]
(“Traditional validation processes are not efficient and cost effective. These deficiencies are
caused by excessive document reviews and approvals, duplicate roles and responsibilities,
inconsistent practices, institutional silos, and other problems. These negatively impact project
timelines, increase costs, and cause non-value-added work.”).
113. See Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1061 (“Firms reinforce this
regulatory resistance [to postapproval changes] by tending to view the manufacturing process to
be largely set at the time of approval.”).
114. See INT’L CONF. ON HARMONISATION OF TECH. REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION
OF PHARMS. FOR HUM. USE, FINAL CONCEPT PAPER: Q12: TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT 1 (2014)
[hereinafter ICH, FINAL CONCEPT PAPER], https://database.ich.org/sites/default/files/
Q12%20Concept%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL68-H2C2] (“[L]ack of alignment has led to
confusion on the necessary information and level of detail in the dossier and its impact on change
management and regulatory reporting.”).
115. Soto, supra note 112.
116. See ICH, FINAL CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 114, at 2 (stressing the need for
harmonization of post-approval change requirements across health authorities around the world);
see also Julia Radzihovsky, Claus-Dieter Schiller, Ralf Gleixner & Barbara Jentges, PostApproval Change Management on a Global Scale: An Inconvenient Complexity for Pharma?,
SCRIP (Nov. 19, 2015), https://scrip.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS118451/Post-ApprovalChange-Management-On-A-Global-Scale-An-Inconvenient-Complexity-For-Pharma [https://
perma.cc/RN8N-5NXK] (“Managing the post-approval regulatory change process for
pharmaceuticals at the global level is complex, unpredictable and time consuming because of
regional differences and frequent changes in procedures, requirements and timelines.”).
117. Radzihovsky et al., supra note 116.
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and post-change manufacturing processes, as different versions of
products are supplied to different countries depending on their
approval status.
The empirical analysis revealed that a majority of patents asserted
during BPCIA litigations could not have been used to make products
at launch.118 Moreover, examining post-approval manufacturing
patents showed that these patents were not only unnecessary to make
a biosimilar, but also unlikely to be practiced when making the original
biologic.119 The following Section shows why such a setup contradicts
the intents behind the BPCIA and the U.S. patent system.
B. Problematic Assertions of Manufacturing Patents
Assertion of these manufacturing patents is problematic on
several levels. First, these patents are written broadly such that other
biosimilar manufacturers cannot practice these patents solely based on
their descriptions. Second, through the patent dance, brand-name
manufacturers can detect instances of infringements that would not
have been otherwise detected. Moreover, even though these
technologies play a limited role in producing biosimilars, brand-name
manufacturers assert these patents to block the entry of biosimilars
altogether. Third, because of their non-product-specific nature,
biosimilar manufacturers cannot proactively seek invalidation of these
patents at the PTO. As a result, biosimilar manufacturers face the
unenviable task of mimicking the brand-name manufacturer’s process
as closely as possible to ensure safety and efficacy while, at the same
time, avoiding all patented processes and technologies.
This Note does not dispute that manufacturing innovations are
critical in cutting manufacturing costs and improving drug quality.
Indeed, patents are crucial incentives to innovate and disclose
inventions in exchange for an exclusive right to practice that
innovation.120 Such disclosure fosters growth of the industry as a whole
by ensuring that up-to-date technical information becomes publicly
accessible.121 However, at least in the field of biologics, these

118. See supra note 90.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
121. Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra note 39, at 426 (“An underlying premise
of this theory is that the required disclosure of the invention by the inventor, once made, will
enable the public to build upon the disclosed technology to further innovation.”).
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manufacturing patents are not fulfilling their teaching role.122 The
patents lack sufficient detail and context for biosimilar manufacturers
to learn how the technology ties into the rest of the manufacturing
processes.123 For example, the earlier example of the ‘302 patent
teaches the use of tangential flow filtration for immunoglobulin
concentration.124 The claims list multiple ranges of protein
concentration and transmembrane pressures, but lack target ranges for
specific molecules and descriptions of other important variables.125
Deviations at this step—even if small—can cause proteins to sustain
too much shear stress and form clumps.126 A long line of court
precedents forced inventors to choose between obtaining a timelimited, but exclusive, patent right, or maintaining trade secrecy.127
However, these patents’ broad descriptions essentially allow
manufacturers to enjoy both patent protections and trade secrecy at a
product level.
As part of the BPCIA’s patent dance, the original biologic
manufacturer gains access to the biosimilar application submitted to
the FDA and engages in a thorough review to detect any potential
infringements of its patents.128 Without the patent dance provisions,
brand-name manufacturers would not have detected these instances of
infringement, especially since biosimilar manufacturing processes are

122. Id. (“[M]any patents withhold vital information necessary for utilizing the inventions
without additional, sometimes substantial, research and development (‘R&D’).”).
123. See Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1050 (showing that despite the
patent statute’s explicit “disclosure” requirement, the disclosure is likely ineffective for biologics
patent applications).
124. See supra notes 111–12. Examples of missing or insufficiently discussed variables are
filter pore size, flow rate, volume, target protein size, aggregation rate, and temperature.
125. See Variable Tangential Flow Filtration, U.S. Patent No. 8,633,302 col. 12 l. 36–62 (filed
July 15, 2008) (providing an example of the transmembrane pressure only when the target
concentration was set at 90 mg/ml). The ‘302 patent is far from the worst example. The principal
patent for Enbrel “describes expressing the protein in . . . at least eight bacterial strains, yeast,
and at least ten different cell culture types from multicellular organisms including hamsters,
monkeys, and humans.” Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1050. The patent
for yeast alone describes “at least 20 different [ways of] expressing the [desired] protein.” Id.
126. Jessica J. Hung, Ameya U. Borwankar, Barton J. Dear, Thomas M. Truskett & Keith P.
Johnston, High Concentration Tangential Flow Ultrafiltration of Stable Monoclonal Antibody
Solutions with Low Viscosities, 508 J. MEMBRANE SCI. 113, 113 (2016) (“If the shear stress is too
large, it may cause protein denaturation and aggregation . . . .”).
127. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
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also shrouded in trade secrecy.129 Even if the original biologic
manufacturers had been aware, the cost and length of patent
infringement suits would have deterred them from asserting their
patents. 130 Costs of bringing patent infringement suits range from
$700,000 to $4 million or more,131 and infringement suits last “about
two and a half years, with post-trial activities often delaying the final
decision for months.”132
Despite the costs and uncertainties associated with these
litigations, the brand-name manufacturers litigate these patents in
district courts, not because of the inherent worth of these
manufacturing patents, but because they can extend monopoly rights
of original biologics. In general, method claims are disfavored and
deemed less valuable than product claims because detecting
infringement of method claims is difficult, and infringers can easily
design around method claims.133 But in the BPCIA context, even a
patent of marginal improvement can foreclose biosimilar access
entirely and allow the brand-name manufacturer to reap rewards from
the biologic itself, not from the patents’ inherent societal value.134 To
illustrate the scale of these litigations, a blockbuster biologic, Humira,
generated over $20 billion in revenue in 2020 alone.135 The actual worth
of these manufacturing patents does not matter. As long as these

129. See David W. Plant, The Impact of Biotechnology on Patent Law, 5 TECH. SOC’Y 95, 101
(1983) (“Detecting and proving infringement of process claims is frequently difficult in any
field.”).
130. See supra notes 84–87and accompanying text.
131. Russ Krajec, Current Patent Litigation Costs Are Between $2.3 to $4M - from the BlueIron
Blog, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/press-release/news-direct-corporat
ion/a5dd5a7d415e7bae6878c87656e90112 [https://perma.cc/KJ5V-QKP7] (reporting survey results
from the American Intellectual Property Lawyer’s Association showing that the low-stakes patent
lawsuits (where less than $1 million was at risk) cost $700,000, and the high-stake lawsuits (where
more than $25 million was at risk) cost $4 million or more).
132. Jason E. Stach & Jeffrey A. Freeman, District Court or the PTO: Choosing Where To
Litigate Patent Invalidity, FINNEGAN (Mar./Apr. 2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/
articles/district-court-or-the-pto-choosing-where-to-litigate-patent.html [https://perma.cc/B942
-DX4F].
133. Part 6: Protect Your Method with Method Claims, CHILDS L. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://child
spatentlaw.com/part-6-protect-your-method-with-method-claims [https://perma.cc/Y9RG-NXK3].
134. See Price & Rai, How Logically Impossible Patents Block Biosimilars, supra note 40, at
863 (noting that drug patents do not “match the social benefit of the innovation to the reward to
the innovator” and that “even a marginal patent on a small innovation can entirely forestall
biosimilar . . . access”).
135. Kevin Dunleavy, 1. Humira, FIERCE PHARMA (May 3, 2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.fierc
epharma.com/special-report/top-20-drugs-by-2020-sales-humira [https://perma.cc/T3M7-TD4V].
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patents can delay the launch of biosimilars and allow original biologics
to generate billions of dollars in revenue, the patents will be litigated
in every possible way, even if the possibility of injunctions is remote or
nonexistent.136
At least some of these patents may indeed be “bad patents.”137 In
the United States, patent examiners spend shockingly little time
evaluating individual patents: approximately eighteen hours over three
years.138 The intensive examination of patents occurs post-issuance and
often in federal district courts.139 However, this delay tactic and
reliance on district court litigation led to issuing too many bad
patents.140 In 2011, Congress introduced an inter partes review to serve
as a cheaper and faster substitute to district court litigation.141 Once a
third party files a petition for inter partes review, the PTO can
reexamine the patentability and invalidate doubtful patents.142
136. See Price & Rai, How Logically Impossible Patents Block Biosimilars, supra note 40, at
863 (“Patents, by providing the exclusive right to practice that innovation, should create
incentives for drugmakers to innovate in exactly that way. However, the size of the reward fails
to match the size of the innovation.”).
137. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What To Do About Bad Patents?,
REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10. Professor Mark Lemley and coauthors coined “bad
patents” to describe patents with obvious and impossible concepts:
Bad patents are everywhere: covering obvious inventions like the crustless peanut
butter and jelly sandwich, ridiculous ideas like a method of exercising a cat with a laser
pointer, and impossible concepts like traveling faster than the speed of light. More
troubling, countless patents that seem reasonable to a lay audience overreach in
technical fields as blatantly as that peanut butter sandwich overreaches in a familiar
one.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10–12 (explaining that since most patents are not asserted, postponing an intensive
determination to the post-issuance stage saves the PTO’s resources that would otherwise have
been spent on reviewing nonasserted patents); see also Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities,
supra note 39, at 465 (“[I]t is not uncommon that inventions that lack any value to society are
granted patents just because they happen to ‘satisfy’ the requirements of patent law.”).
140. Lemley et al., supra note 137, at 12; see also Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant
Opposition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29 (2004) (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive
Director, Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n) (stating that the exorbitant litigations costs and delays
prevent inventors from challenging the validity of bad patents).
141. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299–305 (2011);
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 49, at 18; Stach & Freeman, supra note 132.
142. 35 U.S.C. § 311; see id. §§ 311–319 (describing the inter partes review process); Inter
Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/interpartes-review [https://perma.cc/Q44G-B7HF] (last updated Sept. 4, 2020) (“Inter partes review is
a trial proceeding conducted at the Board to review the patentability of one or more claims in a
patent only on a ground that could be raised under §§ 102 or 103 . . . .”).
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However, since most patents are non-product-specific, biosimilar
applicants cannot anticipate which patents will be asserted against
them and cannot proactively seek invalidation under inter partes
review. For Herceptin, for example, a total of forty-six unique patents
were asserted during BPCIA litigations, but only eleven patents were
challenged through inter partes review proceedings.143 Eight out of
eleven patents were Herceptin-specific patents that biosimilar
manufacturers could easily predict being challenged in BPCIA
litigations.144 In short, a lack of product-identifying information hinders
biosimilar applicants’ ability to invalidate “bad patents” proactively.
The nature of biologics dictates that “the [manufacturing]
process . . . is the product,” and biosimilar manufacturers have to
mimic the brand-name manufacturer’s process as closely as possible to
ensure the biosimilar’s efficacy and safety.145 Yet, biosimilar
manufacturers are not only systematically kept in the dark under
pervasive trade secrecy, but they also have to avoid using brand-name
manufacturers’ patented processes under the threat of BPCIA
litigation. In the next Section, the Note proposes several solutions to
this dilemma.
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
This Note proposes legislative solutions to increase transparency
before and during the patent dance and the elimination of an injunctive
remedy for secondary disputes. First, the disclosure of associated
patents at the time of FDA approval and the two-way exchange of
FDA license information between brand-name and biosimilar
manufacturers would ensure that non-product-specific patents are not
asserted during BPCIA litigations. Second, the elimination of an
injunctive remedy would encourage biosimilar manufacturers to
launch their products despite the pending litigation and would pressure
parties to negotiate a fair price that matches the actual value of the
patented technology.

143. The list of inter partes proceedings was pulled from the Big Molecule Watch Website.
See Big Molecule Watch: PTAB Tracker, GOODWIN, https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/iprs
[https://perma.cc/VR3W-CUT7] (listing inter partes proceedings associated with Herceptin).
144. See id. (listing eight inter partes proceedings associated with Herceptin).
145. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
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A. Increased Transparency Before and During the Patent Dance
In December 2020, Congress passed the Biological Product Patent
Transparency Act (“BPPT”), which requires the FDA to publish the
list of exchanged patents between the brand-name and biosimilar
manufacturers.146 During the patent dance, the parties exchange the
“list of patents for which the [brand-name manufacturer] believes a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the
biosimilar applicant.147 Under the BPPT, the FDA will receive this list
of patents and publish it in the Purple Book, which is “a searchable,
online database that contains information about biological products,
including biosimilar[s].”148 By mandating public disclosure, the BPPT
will enable subsequent biosimilars to “design around” certain
manufacturing patents or seek invalidation through inter partes
review.149
Nevertheless, the BPPT reflects a compromise and does not tackle
all issues arising from a lack of transparency. On the small molecule
side, the applicants must submit patent information with their drug
application150 within thirty days of either the FDA’s approval151 or the
issuance of new patents.152 Adopting a similar approach would address
major shortcomings of the current BPCIA framework. The early
publication would allow biosimilars either to challenge the patents
proactively or design around them early in the drug development
process, avoiding unnecessary changes once at a commercial scale.

146. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 325, 134 Stat. 1182, 2936–
38 (2020) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(9)).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A).
148. Purple Book: Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity
and Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/therapeutic-biologics-applications-bla/purple-book-lists-licensed-biologicalproducts-reference-product-exclusivity-and-biosimilarity-or [https://perma.cc/JLQ2-JTKC] (last
updated Aug. 3, 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(9)(iii); Christopher E. Loh, New Legislation Requires
Certain Patent Information To Be Published in FDA Purple Book for Biological Products,
VENABLE (June 15, 2021), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2021/06/new-legis
lation-requires-certain-patent-info [https://perma.cc/NR3H-77N3].
149. The earlier analysis of Herceptin inter partes review proceedings suggests that the
mandated disclosure in the Purple Book will likely lead to a higher number of inter partes review
challenges. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
150. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)(viii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(a) (2021).
151. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(ii) (2021).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(d)(3) (2021).
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Brand-name manufacturers will also be limited in their ability to assert
post-approval patents.
Increased communication and exchange between the PTO and
FDA could act as an additional check against patent thickets.153 In
Belcher Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Hospira, Inc.,154 the evidence at trial
showed that the manufacturer presented conflicting information to the
FDA and PTO. The manufacturer presented a journal article to the
FDA to prove that racemization of the drug—a consideration in
formulation—was “a well-known process,”155 but withheld that same
article from the PTO.156 The article shows that the drug formulation
was not a new innovation and would have blocked the issuance of a
patent.157 The suit prompted Senators Patrick Leahy and Thom Tillis,
the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Intellectual Property, to send a letter to the PTO to “take steps to
reduce patent applicants’ making inappropriate conflicting statements
in submissions to the PTO and other federal agencies.”158 The very next
day, the FDA also sent a letter to the PTO inviting a dialogue and joint
collaboration to curb possible misuses of the patent system such as
patent thickets.159 Had the FDA not only published, but also actively
monitored validity and relevancy of patents jointly with the PTO, the
PTO would not have granted the patent to the manufacturer in
Belcher, thus negating the need for a follow-on patent litigation.160

153. See Price & Rai, How Logically Impossible Patents Block Biosimilars, supra note 40, at
863 (“Better coordination between FDA and the USPTO would also help limit the problematic
disconnect between these two sources of expertise . . . .”).
154. Belcher Pharms., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 11 F.4th 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
155. Id. at 1347–48, 1348 n.3.
156. Id. at 1351–52.
157. Id. at 1352–53.
158. See Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy & Senator Thom Tillis, United States Senate, to
Andrew Hirshfeld, Acting Dir. of the U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. 1–2 (Sept. 9, 2021), https://
www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/20210909%20Letter%20to%20PTO%20on%20FDA%20
submissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT8V-5956] (raising concerns about contradictory statements
being provided in applications to the FDA and PTO).
159. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Acting Comm’r of the U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
Andrew Hirschfeld, Acting Under Sec’y of Com. for Intell. Prop. & Acting Dir. of the U.S. Pat.
& Trademark Off. 1–2, 4–5 (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/media/152086/download [https://
perma.cc/M8YP-DBAV].
160. The earlier versions of the BPPT would have required the disclosure of patents within
thirty days of drug approval and would have penalized untimely disclosure of patents by strictly
limiting enforcement. E.g., Biologic Patent Transparency Act, S. 659, 116th Cong. § 2(a), (c)
(2019).
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In addition, the two-way exchange of the FDA licensing
information during the patent dance will allow biosimilar applicants to
identify any non-product-specific patents. Although a biosimilar
applicant submits its FDA application to the brand-name
manufacturer, the brand-name manufacturer does not share its license
with biosimilar applicants.161 If this exchange went both ways, a
biosimilar applicant could evaluate the relevancy of asserted patents to
the original biologic. In the earlier example, Genentech asserted a ‘988
patent which disclosed “a method for the recombinant production of a
secreted heterologous immunoglobulin in a CHO cell.”162 With
Genentech’s FDA license in hand, the biosimilar applicant can
determine whether the ‘988 patent was practiced in creating the master
cell line. Lack of any relationship to the original product will present a
powerful argument against an injunctive remedy and an argument for
resolution outside of BPCIA litigation.
The BPCIA’s duty of confidentiality can be extended to all parties
engaged in the patent dance to preserve trade secrets. The BPCIA
statutorily imposes a strict duty of confidentiality for the materials
exchanged during the patent dance.163 Only designated counsel can
view the biosimilar application to determine the possibility of patent
infringement, and counsel cannot share its contents with any other
persons, including employees of brand-name manufacturers.164
Imposing the duty of confidentiality on both parties can prevent
potential disclosure of trade secrets.

161.
162.
text.
163.
164.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See ‘988 Patent, supra note 107, at [57]; see also supra notes 107–09 and accompanying
42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(B).
Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(ii), (C).
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B. Eliminating Injunctive Remedy for Secondary Patents
Further, Congress could ban an injunctive remedy for secondary
patents.165 Under this proposal, courts can only grant monetary relief,166
and brand-name manufacturers can no longer seek the nuclear option
of blocking the entry of biosimilars. The review of all twenty-nine
BPCIA complaints revealed that the brand-name manufacturer sought
the injunctive remedy in all BPCIA cases. Removing the injunction as
an option will give more bargaining power to biosimilar manufacturers
and encourage launches of biosimilars at risk, despite pending
litigation.
Patent rights “have the attributes of personal property”167 and
include “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention.”168 Hence, courts can grant injunctive
relief, but only if “in accordance with the principles of equity.”169
Courts apply a four-factor test: injunctive remedy is warranted when
the plaintiff
has suffered an irreparable injury; . . . remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; . . . considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

165. Banning injunctive remedies altogether would also mean that courts are prohibited from
issuing preliminary injunctions. Although the constitutionality of legislative limitation of the
injunctive power exceeds the scope of this Note, Congress has repeatedly exercised its power to
limit the use of the injunction in federal courts. See generally Congressional Limitation of the
Injunctive Power, JUSTICIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-3/14-congressional-limit
ation-of-the-injunctive-power.html#fn-311 [https://perma.cc/K4JU-AGDG] (providing historical
examples of Congress limiting courts’ injunctive power).
166. The patent holders can receive “reasonable royalt[ies].” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding
for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by
the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” (emphasis added)). For
calculation of the reasonable royalties, courts use Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), factors, which include “[t]he rates paid by the licensee
for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit,” and “[t]he portion of the realizable
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
infringer.” Id. at 1120; see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–35 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (applying the Georgia-Pacific Corp. factors to determine damages).
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
168. Id. § 154(a)(1).
169. See id. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
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and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and . . . the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.170

Secondary patents are unlikely to survive the courts’ four-factor
injunction test. Brand-name manufacturers do not suffer an
irreparable harm that cannot be sufficiently compensated by monetary
damages. If an injunction is granted, defendants are likely unable to
recover the hundreds of millions of dollars they had already invested
in developing a biosimilar. Lastly, the injunctive remedy will harm the
public as patients and payers continue to lack cheaper alternatives.
While courts have not granted an injunctive remedy in BPCIA cases to
date, fifteen out of twenty-eight cases have settled.171 The cases with
looming threats of injunction likely settled prior to reaching a final
judgment.
Courts are unlikely to adopt this approach because courts grant an
injunction in accordance with “traditional principles of equity,” and the
calculus for injunctive remedy is, by design, a fact-intensive inquiry
specific to each case.172 In eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,173 the
Supreme Court adopted a new test for determining whether an
injunction should be granted in a patent infringement case.174 The
Federal Circuit had a “general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional

170. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The “public interest” prong
defines public health broadly and considers many levels of “public interests at stake: broad public
policy concerns, such as health; disruption to consumers of enjoined products; the impact on the
infringer’s employees and community; and the public interest in spurring innovation by granting
inventors, for limited times, exclusive rights to their inventions.” MERGES & DUFFY, supra note
49, at 801. The patentee could also attain a preliminary injunction to block the launch of a
biosimilar during the trial. The patentee must demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits;
the likelihood of irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; that the balance of hardships
tips in its favor; and an injunction’s favorable impact on the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
171. BPCIA Litigations, supra note 93. While this Note was in late editing stage, the Court
granted an injunction against a biosimilar defendant, Samsung Bioepsis. Final Judgment at 1,
Amgen v. Samsung Bioepsis, No. 1:19-cv-11755-CCC-LDW (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2021). The two
patents in dispute, 8,063,182 and 8,163,522, are not secondary patents, but protect APIs.
172. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394; see 35 U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of
cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
173. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
174. Id. at 390.
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circumstances.”175 Numerous amici briefs emphasized the possibility of
a patent holdup, where a minor, yet essential patent to a successful
product can be used to extort disproportionate and excessive royalties
under the threat of an injunction.176 The Supreme Court empowered
district courts to deny injunctions by rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
general rule and emphasized the principles of equity such as “the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant” and the
“public interest” in deciding injunctive remedies.177
The possibility of patent holdup arises in enforcement of
secondary patents.178 The infringer, a biosimilar applicant, has already
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in developing a biosimilar
without knowledge of infringed patents.179 The biosimilar company’s
investments, not the merits of the patented technology, give enormous
leverage to the brand-name manufacturers. In many cases, designing
around patented technology is an extremely difficult task. For
manufacturing process changes, manufacturers may need to modify
equipment, execute time-consuming and expensive validation studies,
update all associated documents, retrain employees, and seek approval
from the FDA.180
The pharmaceutical industry filed a brief in support of
MercExchange that essentially argued in favor of injunction
protections and in defense of “patent trolls.”181 Legal scholars
175. Id. at 391 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
176. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of
Petitioners at 5–8, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (raising
the concern “that patent owners . . . use the threat of an injunction against a complex product
based on one infringing piece to hold up the defendant and extract a greater share of the value of
that product than their patent warrants”); Brief Amici Curiae of Yahoo! Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“Issuing
trolls automatic injunctions upon a finding of infringement allows them to extort settlements that
vastly exceed the true economic value of their patents and imposes enormous social costs . . . .”).
177. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
178. While outside the scope of this Note, a similar argument could apply to small molecule
patents as well.
179. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text (describing patents regarding
manufacturing process innovations and their associated requirements).
181. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in
Support of Respondent at 5–8, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05130) (arguing that injunctions are essential to patent holders in the pharmaceutical industry).
“The term ‘patent troll[s]’ . . . [is used] to describe ‘companies “that try to make a lot of money
off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases
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explained that pharmaceutical companies favor injunctive remedies
because “the billion-dollar molecules” are protected by a single or
handful of patents.182 However, the analysis from this Note shows that
brand-name manufacturers are more likely to act as patent trolls
against biosimilars, because the BPCIA gives them a unique position
to detect any minor infringements and provides a mechanism to assert
patents in a streamlined manner.183 By the time statutory exclusivity
periods end, most primary patents would have expired or are about to
expire shortly.184
Patents “provid[e an] exclusive right to practice” as an incentive
for drug manufacturers to continuously innovate.185 Weakening
protections for secondary patents could hamper innovations by
discouraging knowledge sharing of new innovations.186 However,
despite robust patent protections available today, the know-how of
biologics manufacturing is concentrated in just a handful of companies.
Just eight companies own all biosimilars approved to date, and four

never practiced.”’” Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent
Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 331, 331 n.1 (2006) (quoting Alan Murray, War on ‘Patent Trolls’ May Be Wrong
Battle, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114298577458
004598 [https://perma.cc/L8E7-QBTC]).
182. See Helm, supra note 181, at 339 (“Whereas a firm like eBay utilizes a number of
different patents in its product, [allowing] a troll to extract more than the actual value of a patent,
a pharmaceutical firm can ensure market exclusivity for a drug with a single patent on the active
molecule.”).
183. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The recent ruling from the Federal Circuit in
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi likely means most primary antibody patents are invalid for failing to meet
the enablement requirement. Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 987 F.3d 1080, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
185. Price & Rai, How Logically Impossible Patents Block Biosimilars, supra note 40, at 863.
186. See KEVIN T. RICHARDS, KEVIN J. HICKEY & ERIN H. WARD, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R46221, DRUG PRICING AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING PRACTICES 17–18 (2020) (“If the
brand could not patent the new use . . . , one commentator has argued that insufficient incentives
would have existed to make the investment in R&D necessary to bring the drug to market.”); cf.,
e.g., Kevin Madigan, An Ever-Weakening Patent System Is Threatening the Future of American
Innovation, ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2017/04/28/an-everweakening-patent-system-is-threatening-the-future-of-american-innovation [https://perma.cc/
DXQ8-RJ7V] (describing how “changes to the US patent system are driving . . . research and
[investment] outside [of the U.S.]”); Eileen McDermott, Patent Masters’ Warning: U.S. Patents
Are Weak, Innovation Is Going Overseas, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2019), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/03/27/patent-masters-warning-u-s-patents-weak-innovation-going-ov
erseas/id=107758 [https://perma.cc/C2WH-U8K2] (explaining how developments in patent law
over the last twenty years are driving innovation overseas).
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companies own all nine original biologics.187 Thus, in total, the
“competition . . . occur[s] between 11 pharmaceutical companies,”
with one company manufacturing both brand-name biologics and
biosimilars.188 Patent protections failed to spur new innovations outside
of this handful of companies. Most of the key technologies remain
shrouded in trade secrecy,189 and patents do not contain sufficient
description to become a source of technical information.190 Moreover,
there are less costly methods of overcoming barriers in biologics
manufacturing such as public investment in manufacturing technology
and specialized training programs.191
The injunctive remedy of blocking biosimilars does not match the
size of incremental innovation captured in secondary patents.192
Developing a biosimilar costs somewhere between $100 and $250
million.193 Yet, my empirical analysis showed that most secondary
patents covered incremental improvements to the original molecule,
and a majority of these patents could not have been used to make
products at launch.194 Eliminating injunctive remedies for secondary
patents will lower litigation costs and pressure parties to negotiate a
fair price that matches the actual value of the patented technology.
CONCLUSION
Biologics mark a new frontier in medicine and promise new cures
and treatments. But their promises are meaningless if their price tags
remain out of reach for most Americans. Patent thickets are the main
tools used by brand-name manufacturers to block the entry of
biosimilars as affordable alternatives. This Note analyzed all patents
disputed in BPCIA litigations and revealed that a significant number

187. Heled, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, supra note 20, at 85.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 72 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
191. A public initiative such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)
could be a meaningful first step in generating fundamental knowledge and sharing it in the public
domain. See generally Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 16, at 1031, 1057
(describing potentials of the NIST program in fostering innovation in the biotechnology sector).
For more information about the NIST program, see Biomanufacturing Initiative, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/biomanufacturing-initiative
[https://perma.cc/EF65-MQ6M] (last updated May 4, 2021).
192. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
193. Heled, The Case for Disclosure, supra note 36, at 57.
194. See supra note 90; app B.
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of these patents do not contain any references to original biologics and
are unlikely to be practiced in manufacturing original biologics.
Unless Congress fixes the abusive patent assertions highlighted in
this Note, the older biologics will have perpetually high prices.
Employers, taxpayers, and patients will continue to shoulder billions in
excess drug costs. The early disclosure of applicable patents, the twoway exchange of the FDA license information, and the elimination of
injunctive remedies for secondary patents offer starting points in
ensuring that drug prices fall when they should.
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Appendix A: List of BPCIA Litigations

Number of
Patents Asserted

Docket
Complaint Filing Date
Number

Case
Amgen
Sandoz

v. 14-cv004741

Oct. 24, 2014

0

Janssen
Celltrion

v. 15-cv10698

Mar. 6, 2015

6

Amgen
Apotex

v. 15-cv61631

Aug. 6, 2015

2

Amgen
Hospira

v. 15-cv00839

Sept. 18, 2015

2

Amgen
Apotex

v. 15-cv62081

Oct. 2, 2015

2

Immunex
Sandoz

v. 16-cv01118

Feb. 26, 2016

5

Amgen
Sandoz

v. 16-cv02581

Mar. 4, 2016

2

Abbvie
Amgen

v. 16-cv00666

Aug. 4, 2016

61

Amgen
Coherus

v. 17-cv00546

May 10, 2017

1

Janssen
Samsung
Bioepis

v.

17-cv03524

May 17, 2017

3

Abbvie
BI

v. 17-cv01065

Aug. 2, 2017

74

Amgen
Mylan

v. 17-cv01235

Sept. 22, 2017

2

Genentech v. 17-cvAmgen
01471

Oct. 6, 2017

25

Genentech v. 17-cvPfizer
01672

Nov. 17, 2017

40
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Genentech v. 17-cvSandoz
13507

Dec. 21, 2017

24

Genentech v. 18-cvCelltrion
01025

July 11, 2018

40

Genentech v. 18-cvCelltrion
00574

July 5, 2018

18

Amgen
Kashiv

Mar. 8, 2018

17

Genentech v. 18-cvAmgen
00924

June 21, 2018

37

Amgen
Apotex

v. 18-cv61828

Aug. 7, 2018

1

Abbvie
Sandoz

v. 18-cv12668

Aug. 10, 2018

84

Genentech v.
18-cvSamsung
01363
Bioepis

Sept. 4, 2018

21

Genentech v. 19-cvPfizer
00638

Apr. 5, 2019

22

Immunex
Samsung
Bioepsis

v.

19-cv11755

Apr. 29, 2019

5

Amgen
Tanvex

v. 19-cv01374

July 23, 2019

1

Amgen
Hospira

v. 18-cv01064

July 18, 2018

1

Amgen
Hospira

v. 20-cv00201

Feb. 11, 2020

1

Genentech v.
20-cvSamsung
00859
Bioepis

June 28, 2020

14

v. 18-cv03347
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Appendix B: List of Manufacturing Process Patents Filed One
Year After FDA Approval and Their Classifications

Patent Number

Title

Classification

Janssen v. Celltrion
7,598,083
6,900,056
6,773,600

Chemically Defined Media
Compositions
Chemically Defined Medium for
Cultured Mammalian Cells
Use of Clathrate Modifier, to
Promote Passage of Proteins
During Nanofiltration

Non-Product
Specific
Non-Product
Specific
Non-Product
Specific

Amgen v. Apotex (15-cv-61631)
8,952,138

5,824,784

Refolding Proteins Using a
Chemically Controlled Redox
State
N-Terminally Chemically
Modified Protein Compositions
and Methods

Non-Product
Specific
Non-Product
Specific

Amgen v. Apotex (15-cv-62081)
8,952,138

Refolding Proteins Using a
Chemically Controlled Redox
State

Non-Product
Specific

Amgen v. Sandoz
8,940,878

Capture Purification Processes
Non-Product
for Proteins Expressed in a NonSpecific
Mammalian System

Abbvie v. Amgen
8,663,945

Methods of Producing Anti-TNFAlpha Antibodies in Mammalian Product-Specific
Cell Culture
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8,906,646

8,911,964
9,073,988
9,090,867
9,234,032
9,284,371
9,206,390
9,290,568
9,234,033
9,346,879
9,150,645
9,359,434
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Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Antibody
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Antibody
Fed Batch Method of Making
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibodies
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibody
Fed-Batch Methods for
Producing Adalimumab
Methods of Producing
Adalimumab
Methods to Control Protein
Heterogeneity
Methods to Control Protein
Heterogeneity
Methods to Control Protein
Heterogeneity
Protein Purification Methods to
Reduce Acidic Species
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Acidic Species
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Acidic Species
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Product-Specific

Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific

Amgen v. Coherus
8,273,707

Process for Purifying Proteins

Non-ProductSpecific

Janssen v. Samsung Bioepis
7,598,083
6,900,056

Chemically Defined Media
Compositions
Chemically Defined Medium for
Cultured Mammalian Cells

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
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6,773,600

Use of Clathrate Modifier, to
Promote Passage of Proteins
During Nanofiltration

1961

Non-ProductSpecific

Abbvie v. BI
8,663,945
8,895,009
8,906,372
8,906,646

8,911,964
8,916,153
8,946,395

9,018,361

9,062,106

9,073,988

9,090,688

9,090,867
9,150,645

Methods of Producing Anti-TNFAlpha Antibodies in Mammalian Product-Specific
Cell Culture
Purified Antibody Composition Product-Specific
Purified Antibody Composition Product-Specific
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Product-Specific
Antibody
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Product-Specific
Antibody
Purified Antibody Composition Product-Specific
Purification of Proteins Using
Hydrophobic Interaction
Product-Specific
Chromatography
Isolation and Purification of
Antibodies Using Protein A
Product-Specific
Affinity Chromatography
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Product-Specific
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Fed Batch Method of Making
Product-Specific
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibodies
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Product-Specific
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Product-Specific
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibody
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Product-Specific
Acidic Species
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9,193,787
9,206,390
9,234,032
9,234,033
9,249,182

9,255,143

9,284,371
9,290,568
9,346,879
9,359,434

9,365,645

9,499,614

9,505,834
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Human Antibodies that Bind
Human TNF-Alpha and Methods Product-Specific
of Preparing the Same
Methods to Control Protein
Product-Specific
Heterogeneity
Fed-Batch Methods for
Product-Specific
Producing Adalimumab
Methods to Control Protein
Product-Specific
Heterogeneity
Purification of Antibodies Using
Hydrophobic Interaction
Product-Specific
Chromatography
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Product-Specific
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Methods of Producing
Product-Specific
Adalimumab
Methods to Control Protein
Product-Specific
Heterogeneity
Protein Purification Methods to
Product-Specific
Reduce Acidic Species
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Product-Specific
Acidic Species
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Product-Specific
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Methods for Modulating Protein
Glycosylation Profiles of
Recombinant Protein
Product-Specific
Therapeutics Using
Monosaccharides and
Oligosaccharides
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Product-Specific
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
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1963

Methods to Control Protein
Product-Specific
Heterogeneity
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Product-Specific
Acidic Species

Amgen v. Mylan
8,273,707
9,643,997

Process for Purifying Proteins
Capture Purification Processes
for Proteins Expressed an A
Non-Mammalian System

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Genentech v. Amgen

8,460,895

8,512,983

8,574,869
8,633,302
9,441,035

9,487,809

Method for Producing
Recombinant Proteins With A
Constant Content of pCO2 in the
Medium
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-free Cell Culture
Media
Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides
Variable Tangential Flow
Filtration
Cell Culture Media and Methods
of Antibody Production
Decreasing Lactate Level and
Increasing Polypeptide
Production by Downregulating
the Expression of Lactate
Dehydrogenase and Pyruvate
Dehydrogenase Kinase

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Amgen v. Kashiv
7,083,948

Polypeptide Purification
Non-ProductReagents and Methods for Their
Specific
Ise
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7,118,884

7,384,765

7,427,659

7,662,930

7,735,525
7,781,395
8,191,566
8,273,707
8,940,878

8,952,138

9,418,416
9,632,095
9,643,997
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Method for Controlling
Metallophosphate Precipitation
in High Cell Density
Fermentations
Cell Culture Performance with
Betaine
Process for Purifying Proteins in
a Hydrophobic Interaction
Chromatography Flow-through
Fraction
Polishing Steps Used in Multistep Protein Purification
Processes
Thermally Insulated Apparatus
for Liquid Chromatographic
Analysis
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Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Non-ProductProcess for Purifying Proteins
Specific
Valve for Controlling the Flow of Non-ProductSteam and Other Fluids
Specific
Non-ProductProcess for Purifying Proteins
Specific
Capture Purification Processes
Non-Productfor Proteins xpressed in a NonSpecific
Mammalian System
Refolding Proteins Using a
Non-ProductChemically Controlled Redox
Specific
State
Methods and Apparati for
Non-ProductNondestructive Detection of
Specific
Undissolved Particles in a Fluid
Device and Method for
Non-ProductDetermining Reaction Kinetics Specific
Capture Purification Processes
Non-Productfor Proteins Expressed in a NonSpecific
Mammalian System
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Video Trigger Synchronization
for Improved Particle Detection
in a Vessel
Refolding Proteins Using a
Chemically Controlled Redox
State

1965

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Genentech v. Pfizer (17-cv-01672)
8,574,869

7,485,704

7,807,799

6,586,206

6,716,602
7,390,660
8,357,301

8,460,895

8,512,983
8,633,302
8,771,988

Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Non-ProductReduction During Recombinant
Specific
Production of Polypeptides
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During protein A Affinity
Product-Specific
Chromatography
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Product-Specific
Chromatography
Methods for Making
Non-ProductRecombinant Proteins Using
Specific
Apoptosis Inhibitors
Metabolic Rate Shifts in
Non-ProductFermentations Expressing
Specific
Recombinant Proteins
Methods for Growing
Non-ProductMammalian Cells In Vitro
Specific
Chromatography Equipment
Non-ProductCharacterization
Specific
Method for Producing
Recombinant Proteins With a
Non-ProductConstant Content of pCO2 In the Specific
Medium
Production of Proteins in
Non-ProductGlutamine-Free Cell Culture
Specific
Media
Variable Tangential Flow
Non-ProductFiltration
Specific
Protein Expression From
Non-ProductMultiple Nucleic Acids
Specific
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1966
8,822,655
9,047,438
9,080,183
9,428,548
9,428,766

9,487,809

9,714,293
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Pre-Filtration Adjustment of
Buffer Solutes
Chromatography Equipment
Characterization
Promoter
Enhanced Protein Purification
Through a Modified Protein A
Elution
Protein Expression From
Multiple Nucleic Acids
Decreasing Lactate Level and
Increasing Polypeptide
Production by Downregulating
the Expression of Lactate
Dehydrogenase and Pyruvate
Dehydrogenase Kinase
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
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Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific

Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Genentech v. Sandoz
6,610,516
6,870,034
7,485,704

7,807,799

8,314,225

8,512,983

Cell Culture Process
Protein Purification
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Heavy Chain Mutant Leading to
Improved Immunoglobulin
Production
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media

Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
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Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Non-ProductReduction During Recombinant
Specific
Production of Polypeptides
Non-ProductProtein Purification
Specific
Production of Proteins in
Non-ProductGlutamine-Free Cell Culture
Specific
Media

Genentech v. Amgen
8,574,869
8,771,988
9,428,766

9,487,809

8,710,196
8,357,301
8,512,983

8,460,895

6,586,206

Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides
Protein Expression From
Multiple Nucleic Acids
Protein Expression From
Multiple Nucleic Acids
Decreasing Lactate Level and
Increasing Polypeptide
Production by Downregulating
the Expression of Lactate
Dehydrogenase and Pyruvate
Dehydrogenase Kinase
Protein Purification
Chromatography Equipment
Characterization
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Method for Producing
Recombinant Proteins With a
Constant Content Of pCO2 in
the Medium
Methods for Making
Recombinant Proteins Using
Apoptosis Inhibitors

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Product-Specific

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
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8,044,017
9,493,744
6,870,034
9,047,438
9,080,183
8,314,225

9,714,293
9,868,760
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Protein Purification
Methods for Viral Inactivation
and Other Adventitious Agents
Protein Purification
Chromatography Equipment
Characterization
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Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Promoter
Heavy Chain Mutant Leading to
Non-ProductImproved Immunoglobulin
Specific
Production
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Product-Specific
Media
Non-ProductProtein Purification
Specific

Genentech v. Celltrion (18-cv-01025)
6,610,516
7,485,704

7,807,799

8,574,869

Cell Culture Process
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides

Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific

Genentech v. Celltrion (18-cv-00574)
8,574,869

7,485,704

Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Non-ProductReduction During Recombinant
Specific
Production of Polypeptides
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Product-Specific
Chromatography
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7,807,799

6,586,206

6,716,602
7,390,660
8,357,301

8,460,895

8,512,983
8,633,302
8,771,988
8,822,655
9,047,438
9,080,183
9,428,548
9,428,766
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Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Methods for Making
Recombinant Proteins Using
Apoptosis Inhibitors
Metabolic Rate Shifts in
Fermentations Expressing
Recombinant Proteins
Methods for Growing
Mammalian Cells In Vitro
Chromatography Equipment
Characterization
Method for Producing
Recombinant Proteins With a
Constant Content of pCO2 in the
Medium
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Variable Tangential Flow
Filtration
Protein Expression From
Multiple Nucleic Acids
Pre-Filtration Adjustment of
Buffer Solutes
Chromatography Equipment
Characterization
Promoter
Enhanced Protein Purification
Through a Modified Protein A
Elution
Protein Expression From
Multiple Nucleic Acids

1969

Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific
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9,487,809

9,714,293

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Decreasing Lactate Level and
Increasing Polypeptide
Production by Downregulating
the Expression of Lactate
Dehydrogenase and Pyruvate
Dehydrogenase Kinase
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media

4/17/2022 12:43 PM

[Vol. 71:1923

Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Amgen v. Apotex
9,856,287

Refolding Proteins Using a
Chemically Controlled Redox
State

Non-ProductSpecific

Abbvie v. Sandoz
8,663,945

8,906,646

8,911,964

9,018,361
9,073,988
9,085,618
9,090,867
9,150,645
9,234,032

Methods of Producing Anti-TNFAlpha Antibodies in Mammalian Product-Specific
Cell Culture
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Product-Specific
Antibody
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Human Anti-TNF-Alpha
Product-Specific
Antibody
Isolation and Purification of
Antibodies Using Protein A
Product-Specific
Affinity Chromatography
Fed Batch Method of Making
Product-Specific
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibodies
Low Acidic Species
Compositions and Methods for Product-Specific
Producing and Using the Same
Fed-Batch Method of Making
Product-Specific
Anti-TNF-Alpha Antibody
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Product-Specific
Acidic Species
Fed-Batch Methods for
Product-Specific
Producing Adalimumab
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9,359,434

9,365,645

9,505,834

9,683,033
9,957,318

4/17/2022 12:43 PM

HOW PATENTS BLOCK BIOSIMILARS
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Methods to Control Protein
Heterogeneity
Protein Purification Methods to
Reduce Acidic Species
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Acidic Species
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Methods for Controlling the
Galactosylation Profile of
Recombinantly-Expressed
Proteins
Cell Culture Methods to Reduce
Acidic Species
Protein Purification Methods to
Reduce Acidic Species

1971

Product-Specific

Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Product-Specific
Product-Specific

Genentech v. Samsung Bioepsis (18-cv-01363)
6,407,213
8,574,869
7,390,660
7,485,704

7,807,799

Method for Making Humanized
Antibodies
Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides
Methods for Growing
Mammalian Cells In Vitro
Reducing Protein a Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography
Reducing Protein A Leaching
During Protein A Affinity
Chromatography

Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific
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9,714,293

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
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Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Genentech v. Pfizer (19-cv-00638)
7,846,336
8,314,225

8,512,983

8,574,869
9,441,035
9,714,293
9,884,904

Chromatographic Methods
Heavy Chain Mutant Leading to
Improved Immunoglobulin
Production
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides
Cell Culture Media and Methods
of Antibody Production
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Methods for Purifying
Polypeptide Solutions

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific
Product-Specific
Non-ProductSpecific

Amgen v. Tanvex
Refolding Proteins Using a
Chemically Controlled Redox
State
Genentech v. Samsung Bioepis (20-cv-00859)
Method for Producing
Recombinant Proteins with a
8,460,895
Constant Content of pCO2 in the
Medium
9,856,287

Non-ProductSpecific

Non-ProductSpecific
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HOW PATENTS BLOCK BIOSIMILARS
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
Prevention of Disulfide Bond
Reduction During Recombinant
Production of Polypeptides
Cell Culture Media and Methods
of Antibody Production
Decreasing Lactate Level and
Increasing Polypeptide
Production by Downregulating
the Expression of Lactate
Dehydrogenase and Pyruvate
Dehydrogenase Kinase
Production of Proteins in
Glutamine-Free Cell Culture
Media
CO2 Profile Cultivation
Method to Improve Virus
Filtration Capacity
Cell Culture Compositions

Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Product-Specific

Product-Specific

Product-specific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific
Non-ProductSpecific

Amgen v. Hospira (18-cv-01064)
9,643,997

Capture Purification Processes
Non-Productfor Proteins Expressed in a NonSpecific
Mammalian System

Amgen v. Hospira (20-cv-00201)
8,273,707

Process for Purifying Proteins

1973

Non-ProductSpecific

